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ABSTRACTS

ment of governmental immunity. The doctrine of parental immunity, however, continues to be firmly applied by the states. It is
not probable that the Adkins decision will have any effect on the
application of the doctrines of governmental and parental immuity in West Virginia.
James Truman Cooper

ABSTRACTS
Conflicts of Law-Collateral Attack of Foreign Divorce Decrees
The petitioner was granted a divorce in the State of Florida in
1945. The award of alimony purported to bind the husband's
estate. Under Florida law such an arrangement is not valid without an express agreement of the parties. The husband made no
appeal for correction of the decree. After her husband's death in
1958, the petitioner instituted an action in a West Virginia circuit
court in order to determine her rights in the estate. The trial
court held the divorce decree to be invalid and unenforceable to
the extent that it would be binding upon the husband's estate.
On appeal the West Virginia Supreme Court upheld the collateral
attack. Certiorari was then granted by the United States Supreme
Court, and the decision was reversed based upon the reply by the
Florida appellate court to certain certified questions. Aldrich v.
Aldrich, 378 U.S. 540 (1964).
Article IV, section 1, of the federal constitution requires that a
judgment of one state be given full faith and credit in every other
state. As a consequence it is generally held that a collateral attack
may be maintained only for fraud in procurement or lack of jurisdiction. Gavenda Bros. v. Elkins Limestone Co., 145 W. Va. 732,
116 S.E.2d 910 (1960).
The problem in the instant case involves jurisdiction. Prior to
the rendering of this decision by the United States Supreme Court,
courts were divided over the issue of a defective judgment providing a basis for collateral attack. Some courts advanced the view
that erroneous exercise of jurisdiction established a ground for
collateral attack. West End IrrigationCo. v. Garvey, 117 Colo. 109,
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184 P.2d 476 (1947); Robertson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 520,
25 S.E.2d 352 (1943). Other courts maintained that once a court
acquired jurisdiction the parties could not later collaterally attack
a defective or imperfect judgment unless it was procured fraudu.
lently. Boreman v. Borman, 291 Ill. App. 135, 9 N.E.2d 667 (1937);
Wallace v. Wallace, 111 Cal. App. 500, 295 Pac. 1061 (1931); 65
W. V.&. L. REv. 89 (1962).
The Court in the principal case appears to have settled the controversy. In rendering the opinion, the Court relied upon the
response of the Florida court to certified questions concerning
applicable Florida law. Finding that a direct attack was impossible in Florida because the time for appeal had elapsed, the Court
reaffirmed the decision in Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581
(1950). Here, the Court disallowed a collateral attack in an instance where a direct attack could not be maintained in the granting state.
In the instant case the Court completely accepts the reasoning
of the dissent of Judge Calhoun of the West Virginia Supreme
Court. The opinion declares with finality that once the court granting full faith and credit has established jurisdiction and the absence
of fraud, it is precluded from any investigation into the merits of
the case.

Personal Property-The Application of the Rule in Shelley's Case
By the operation of the Rule in Shelley's Case, P claimed absolute ownership in one-third of a residuary estate which contained
both real and personal property. The grant in the decedent's will
devised to P an undivided one-third interest for life with the remainder in fee simple to his heirs. Held, affirmed. A grant to
A for life, remainder to his heirs-at-law becomes a fee simple in A.
The rule applies whether the property is real, personal or a mixture of the two. Riegel v. Lyerly, 143 S.E.2d 65 (N.C. 1965).
The Rule in Shelley's Case arose historically as a method of preventing the frustration of feudal incidents. Because these incidents
were related only to land, there is no real reason for extending the
rule to personal property. Generally, Shelley's Rule has not been
so extended. Security Trust Co. v. Cooling, 28 Del. Ch. 303, 42
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A.2d 784 (1945); Jones v. Rees, 22 Del. 504, 69 Ad. 785 (1908);
Bennett v. Bennett, 217 Ill. 434, 75 N.E. 339 (1905). However,
subject to some limitations, courts have applied the rule by analogy.
Hall v. Gradwohl, 113 Md. 293, 77 AtI. 480 (1910); Sands v. Old
Colony Trust Co., 195 Mass. 575, 81 N.E. 300 (1904).
Decisions making such application have done so as a rule of
construction, thus yielding to the intent of the testator. Hall v.
Gradwohl, supra; Sands v. Old Colony Trust Co., supra. Contrary
opinions have been rendered upon the theory that Shelley's Rule
remains a rule of law when extended to personal property and
should be strictly applied despite the intention of the testator.
Hughes v. Nicklas, 70 Md. 484, 171 Ad. 398 (1889).
A further limitation arises with respect to testamentary trust
provisions. In cases where a trust was created in settlement of an
estate with power in the trustee to sell, to reinvest or to convey
the subject matter, the courts have said that the Rule in Shelley's
Case would not be applied. Bross v. Bross, 123 Fla. 758, 167 So.
669 (1936); Sands vo. Old Colony Trust Co., supra. In Bucklin v.
Creighton, 18 R.I. 325, 27 At. 221 (1893), the testator deposited
money in trust to pay the income to C for life with the remainder
to his heirs in fee simple. The court found the rule was inapplicable because it was clearly the intention of the testator that C
should have only a life estate.
In Melhollen's Adm'r v. Rice, 13 W. Va. 510 (1878), the West
Virginia court recognized that Shelley's Rule was applicable to
personal property by analogy. However, the rule was not brought
into operation in this case because of the factual situation.

Torts-The Effect of Willful and Wanton
Conduct on Parental Immunity
P, a minor, was struck and injured by his father who willfully
and negligently operated his vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol. The trial court granted judgment for the father on the
theory that a minor child cannot sue his parents in tort. Held, reversed. The parent-child relationship cannot be used to prevent
redress for a child who has been the victim of willful and wanton
misconduct. To hold otherwise would be against the principles of
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public policy upon which the immunity was originally granted.
Teramano v. Teramano, 1 Ohio App.2d 504, 255 N.E.2d 586

(1965).
The rule that an unemancipated minor child may not maintain
an action against a parent for ordinary negligence is a well-established precedent. Baker v. Baker, 364 Mo. 453, 263 S.W.2d 29
(1953); Securo v. Securo, 110 W. Va. 1, 156 S.E. 750 (1931);
McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903). Some
courts have applied this rule in such absolute terms that children
have been denied recovery in instances of extreme physical cruelty
and forcible rape. Cook v. Cook, 232 Mo. App. 994, 124 S.W.2d 675
(1939); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
However, such application has subjected the rule to much criticism. Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash.2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952). As a
consequence the modem trend of litigation has been to modify or
qualify the existing principle. Most deviations have been in the
areas of intentional torts, master-servant and vocational relationships and indemnity insurance.
Indemnity insurance has presented a challenge to the reasoning
upon which the rule was predicated. When a parent is protected
by insurance, tort recovery by the child is no longer a threat to
domestic tranquillity. On the contrary, both the parent and the
child would derive benefit. Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E.
538 (:1932); 39 W. VA. L. RExv. 266 (1932). This view has had
limited acceptance, and courts have continued to deny relief on the
theory that the fact of carrying insurance should not create a liabilit" that was previously non-existant. Baker v. Baker, supra; Norfolk So. Ry. v. Gretakis, 162 Va. 597, 174 S.E. 841 (1934).
Further limitations have been imposed upon this general rule in
instances where the tort was committed by the parent in a masterservant or vocational capacity. The courts, however, are divided
on this issue. Recovery was granted in Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va.
21, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939), and in Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352,
150 At. 905 (1930), but denied in Belleson v. Skilbeck, 185 Minn.
537, 242 N.W. 1 (1932). Similar to the rationale in the insurance
cases, the courts have reasoned that because the parent is being
sued in his vocational capacity, recovery is no threat to domestic
ties.
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Where the tort is intentional or results from willful and wanton
conduct, recent decisions have allowed recovery. Wright v. Wright,
85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952); Mahnke v. Moore, 179 Md.
61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951). In a case factually similar to the instant
case, the court held that recovery should be granted in a wrongful
death action. The child's death occurred as a result of an automobile accident caused by his father's excessive speed and state of
intoxication while driving. Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d
445 (1950). The West Virginia court expressly reserved this question in affirming the general rule. However, the court intimated
that evil intention or malevolent motive might give rise to a modification of the rule. Securo v. Securo, supra.

Torts-Liability for Defective Motor Vehicular Brakes
The P and his wife were driving in an automobile in a southernly direction. When P stopped for a traffic light, a vehicle driven
by D ran into the rear of P's car inflicting injury to his wife and
damaging the automobile. The collision was attributed to the
mechanical failure of the vehicle's brakes. The trial court rendered
judgment on the verdict in favor of the D. Held, reversed. An
injury caused by the failure of brake equipment is a self-created
emergency. More than ordinary care is required in complying
with the statutory duty of keeping the brakes in good working
order. The D is therefore negligent as a matter of law. Bird v.
Hart, 2 Ohio St.2d 9, 205 N.E.2d 887 (1965).
Although no absolute duty to keep a vehicle in safe condition
exists, an owner is bound to use reasonable care to do so. 5 Am.
Jur. Automobiles § 251 (1936). The obligation has frequently been
enlarged and re-enforced by statutory provisions in some states.
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 261 (1949).
The general rule is that when a statutory violation is the proximate cause of an injury, a motorist may not seek relief by invoking
the emergency doctrine. Cline v. Christie, 117 W. Va. 192, 184
S.E. 854 (1936); Rohde v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 249 S.W.2d
417 (Mo. 1952). Relief may be granted only to one who has
neither caused nor contributed to the emergency. Rhode v. St.
Louis Pub. Serv. Co., supra.
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However, the courts have not been uniform in determining the
degree of negligence raised by such infractions. Tarr v. Keller
Lumber and Constr. Co., 106 W. Va. 99, 144 S.E. 881 (1928).
Some courts simply have ruled that it is negligence to drive on the
highway with defective brakes. Foster v. Farra, 117 Ore. 286, 243
Pac. 778 (1926); Gilmore v. Caswell, 65 Cal. App. 299, 224 Pac.
249 (1924). Other decisions have regarded a statutory violation as
negligence per se. Beck v. Wade, 100 Ga. App. 79, 110 S.E.2d 43
(1959).
The pertinent statutes in West Virginia require that every vehicle
be equipped with brakes adequate to control the movement of the
vehicle. W. VA. CODE ch. 17C, art. 15, § 31 (Michie 1961). A
further provision requires that all vehicular equipment be kept in
good working order. W. VA. CODE ch. 17C, art. 16, § 1 (Michie
1961). The West Virginia court held in Spurlin v. Nardo, 145
W. Va. 408, 114 S.E.2d 913 (1960) that an injury caused by defective brakes is prima facie evidence of negligence. Thus, despite
the fact that the West Virginia opinions concur with those of the
instant case as to the application of the emergency doctrine, it is
questionable whether the West Virginia court would direct a
verdict for P on the ground that the violation was negligence as a
matter of law.
Ellen FairfaxWarder

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol68/iss1/16

6

